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Background
In recent years, supply chain coordination mechanisms such as the revenue sharing con-
tract and return contract have become the hot topics faced by both some scholars and 
practitioners. Coordination among the supply chain members is an important strategy 
in supply chain. Contracts are considered as effective instruments to bring the manu-
facturer and the retailer in a decentralized supply chain to operate in coordination. The 
contract can overcome the problem of double marginalization exited in supply chain 
system. The retailer can be induced to order right quantity, and maximize the total profit 
of the supply chain system through the negotiation among the members with contracts. 
In such supply chain contracts, the risks caused by the uncertain demand are shifted 
from the retailers to the manufacturers. In return, the order quantities of the retailers in 
such supply chain contracts are equal to those in the centralized decision making system 
so as to maximize the sum of profits for the manufacturers and retailers.
Revenue sharing (RS) contract has achieved a great success in practice among the 
supply chain members and widely be used in the movie industry. Cachon and Lariviere 
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(2005) compared the RS contract to some other kinds of contracts and pointed out its 
strengths and limitations. Chen et al. (2011) studied the RS contract in a two stage sup-
ply chain, where the demand was a function of retail price and size of self-space. Rhee 
et al. (2010, 2014) used the spanning RS contract for coordinating a multi-echelon sup-
ply chain in a random demand setting, where the most downstream member shared his 
profit with all the other members. Krishnan and Winter (2011) examined the coordinat-
ing role of the RS contract comprising two competitive retailers and one manufacturer. 
Zhang et  al. (2012) also studied the RS contract problem with two competitive retail-
ers in a demand disruption setting. Recently, Palsule-Desai (2013) proposed a revenue-
dependent RS contract to coordinate the supply chain in a two-period model. Giovanni 
(2014) proposed a reverse RS contract to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain with 
green advertising strategies. Panda (2014) used the RS contract aimed at coordinat-
ing the socially responsible issues of supply chain with a linear demand. Hsueh (2014) 
also developed a RS contract with corporate social responsibility in a random demand 
environment.
Return contract is also widely adopted for some high new products with short life 
cycles in a number of industries such as personal computers, fashion apparel and toys. 
Yao et al. (2005) discussed the impact of information sharing on the return contract in 
both traditional retail channels and direct channels. Chen (2011) also studied the impact 
of the sharing customer returns information on the return policy in the Manufacturer 
Stackelberg game scenario. Yao et al. (2008) examined the effects of price-sensitivity fac-
tors on the return contract in a stochastic and price-dependent demand setting. Zhao 
et  al. (2014) also studied the return contract in a price-dependent downward-sloping 
demand environment, but they mainly focused on the problem of the demand uncer-
tainty level. Chen and Bell (2011) used the return policy for coordinating a decentralized 
supply chain in a price-dependent demand setting. Chen and Bell (2012) also examined 
the coordination issue of the dual-channel through return policies. In addition, Ai et al. 
(2012) proposed a full return policy to study the competition problem among two sup-
ply chains with uncertain demand. Wu (2013) also used a return contract to coordinate 
the competing supply chains, where two power distributions namely Vertical Integration 
model and Manufacturer’s Stackelberg game were considered. Huang et al. (2014) devel-
oped a return contract to coordinate the supply chain comprising many retailers with a 
secondary market. Yoo (2014) used a return policy to coordinate the supply chain, where 
the supplier has two different risk attitudes: risk averse and risk neutral.
The works mentioned above analyzed the revenue sharing contract and the return 
contract in a linear or random market demand. In recent years, fuzzy set theory has 
been adopted by more and more scholars to solve the problems in the supply chain man-
agement. For instance, Xu and Zhai (2008) considered the demand as a triangular fuzzy 
variable and developed a fuzzy newsboy model. Xu and Zhai (2010) also extend their 
work to the coordination problem, where the demand was considered as an L-R fuzzy 
number. Hu et  al. (2010) developed the fuzzy decentralized and centralized decision 
marking systems with imperfect quality in a fuzzy random demand setting. Kazemi et al. 
(2010) investigated the EOQ model with backorders in a fuzzy decision environment, 
where the parameters of the model were considered as the trapezoidal and triangular 
numbers. Samal and Pratihar (2014) also studied the fuzzy EOQ model without and with 
Page 3 of 25Sang  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:953 
backordering. In addition, Chen and Cheng (2014) studied the inventory policies with a 
multi-stage supply chain, where the demand and inventory cost were considered as fuzzy 
variables. Ye and Li (2011) developed a Stackelberg game model between a supplier and 
a retailer under a fuzzy market demand environment, where the risks of the supply chain 
members were considered. Yu and Jin (2011) adopted signed distance method to study 
the return contract under uncertain demands, where the demand and the retail price 
were regarded as the triangular fuzzy numbers. Yu et al. (2013) also studied the fuzzy 
newsboy model in a price-dependent demand environment. In recent paper, Chang and 
Yeh (2013) analyzed the centralized and decentralized decision-making systems with 
returnable products, where the demand was considered as the trapezoidal number. Sang 
(2013) studied the revenue sharing contract and the return contract comprising multiple 
competing retailers with fuzzy demand. Zhang et al. (2014) adopted the crisp possibilis-
tic mean method to study a two-level return contract in a fuzzy random demand envi-
ronment. Recently, some researchers such as Boutkhoum et al. (2015), Abdolmajidi et al. 
(2016) and Hanine et al. (2016) studied the applications of fuzzy theory in other optimal 
problems. Boutkhoum et al. (2015) studied the industrial location selection problem in 
a fuzzy decision making environment. Hanine et al. (2016) proposed the fuzzy TODIM 
and fuzzy AHP methods to select the landfill location. Abdolmajidi et  al. (2016) used 
fuzzy logic for modeling the spatial data infrastructure development.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study on the RS contract and the return 
contract that the parameters of supply chain models are all characterize by the fuzzy 
variables. However, in the real word, the rapid change of the product life cycle makes 
the parameters of the supply chain models more and more uncertain. These uncertain-
ties may be the retail price, market demand, costs of the supply chain members, etc. For 
practical purpose, the linguistic terms are usually used to describe these uncertainties, 
such as “the retail price is about b, but definitely not greater than c and not less than a”. 
Therefore, we assume the fuzzy number variables can be forecasted and expressed as 
triangular membership functions. Triangular fuzzy numbers are easy to handle arith-
metically and have intuitive interpretations. Triangular fuzzy numbers as one types of 
left–right fuzzy numbers are adopted because they are considered the most fit for mod-
eling uncertain parameters (Xu and Zhai 2008; Yu et al. 2013).
This study aims at developing coordination mechanisms of the manufacturer and the 
retailer and pursuing their optimal strategies when the parameters of the models are 
fuzzy. The contributions of this article are as follows. Firstly, we study the supply chain 
coordination mechanisms in a fuzzy decision making environment. The market demand, 
retail price, costs of the manufacturer and the retailer, savage value of the unsold product 
are all fuzziness. Secondly, both the RS contract and the return contract are considered 
in a fuzzy decision making environment. Thirdly, we discuss the impacts of the fuzziness 
of the market demand, retail price, and savage value of the product on the optimal poli-
cies in two contracts. These can improve decision making of the experts in supply chain 
management.
The article is organized as follows. Some definitions and propositions about the 
triangular fuzzy number related to this paper are introduced in section “Prelimi-
naries”. The notations and assumptions of the models are introduced in section “Nota-
tions and assumptions”. In section “Models and solution approaches”, the centralized 
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decision-making system, the RS contract and the return contract in a fuzzy decision 
making environment are proposed. In section “Numerical examples”, some numerical 
examples are given to elucidate the solutions of each model. Last section “Conclusions” 
summarizes the work.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some definitions and propositions about the fuzzy set the-
ory for modeling the supply chain contract with uncertain factors.
Definition 1 The fuzzy set A˜ = (a1, a2, a3) is said to be the triangular fuzzy number, 
when it has a following membership function
where a1, a2 and a3 are crisp numbers with a1 < a2 < a3. When x ∈ [a1, a2], 
A˜L(x) = x−a1a2−a1 is continuous and increasing about x. When x ∈ (a2 a3], A˜R(x) =
a3−x
a3−a2 is 
continuous and decreasing about x.
Definition 2 If a1 > 0, then A˜ = (a1, a2, a3) is called the positive triangular fuzzy 
number.




 is called the α cut set of A˜ 
and is denoted by the interval t[A˜−1L (α), A˜−1R (α)], with
where A˜−1L (α) and A˜−1R (α) are the left and right cut sets of A˜(α).
Example 1 Given α ∈ [0, 1], the α cut set of A˜ = (a1, a2, a3) can be given as
where A˜−1L  and A˜−1R  are the inverse functions of A˜L and A˜R respectively.
The following Propositions 1 and 2 can be obtained through the extension principle of 
the fuzzy set theory.
Proposition 1 Given α ∈ [0, 1], let A˜ be a positive triangular fuzzy variable with α cut 





a2−a1 , x ∈ [a1, a2],
a3−x




L (α) = inf
{
x ∈ R : µA˜(x) ≥ α
}
, and A˜−1R (α) = sup
{
x ∈ R : µA˜(x) ≥ α
}
.














, k ∈ R−.
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Proposition 2 Given α ∈ [0, 1], let B˜ and C˜ be two positive triangular fuzzy numbers 
with α cut sets [B˜−1L (α), B˜−1R (α)] and [C˜−1L (α), C˜−1R (α)], respectively. Then we have
In addition, to solve the fuzzy optimal models, we must first convert the fuzzy number 
into a crisp one. Our study adopts the ranking method proposed by Liu and Liu (2002), 
which is given by










Example 2 The triangular fuzzy number A˜ = (a1, a2, a3) has an expected value
Example 3 For two nonnegative independent triangular fuzzy numbers A˜ = (a1, a2, a3) 
and B˜ = (b1, b2, b3), we have
(a) B˜(α)+ C˜(α) =
[
B˜−1L (α)+ C˜−1L (α), B˜−1R (α)+ C˜−1R (α)
]
,
(b) B˜(α)− C˜(α) =
[

















































[(1− α)a1 + αa2 + αa2 + (1− α)a3]dα =














































[((1− α)a1 + αa2)((1− α)b1 + αb2)
+(αa2 + (1− α)a3)(αb2 + (1− α)b3)]dα
= 2a1b1 + a1b2 + 3a2b1 + 3a2b3 + a3b2 + 2a3b3
12
.
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Proposition 4 (Liu and Liu 2002) Let A˜ and B˜ be two independent positive triangular 
fuzzy numbers, then
where m and n are real numbers.
Notations and assumptions
In a single period setting, we examine a two-echelon supply chain in which a retailer 
orders the short life product from a manufacturer and sells it to customers in a high 
uncertain environment. The retailer has only one chance to order such product, since 
its selling season is much shorter than its order lead time. The uncertain demand faced 
by the retailer is assumed to be a positive triangular fuzzy number D˜ = (d1, d2, d3) 
with 0 < d1 < d2 < d3. d2 is the most possible value of demand D˜, this means that the 
demand is about d2. d1 and d3 are the minimum and maximum values of the demand, 
respectively. The fuzzy demand D˜ the following membership function µD˜(x):
For computational convenience, we use L(x) and R(x) denote the left and right spread 
functions of the fuzzy demand D˜. The values of d1, d2 and d3 can be estimated by the 
decision makers.
The other notations used in this paper are as follows
q  Retailer’s order quantity;
p˜  Retailer’s fuzzy retail price of unit product;
c˜m  Manufacturer’s fuzzy production cost of unit product;
c˜r  Retailer’s fuzzy operational cost of unit product;
v˜  Unsold product’s fuzzy salvage value of unit product;
w  Manufacturer’s wholesale price of unit product;
Φ  Retailer’s percentage revenue sharing in the RS contract with 0 < Φ < 1;
b  Manufacturer’s return price of unit unsold product in the return contract;
Π˜R  Retailer’s fuzzy profit;
Π˜M  Manufacturer’s fuzzy profit;
Π˜SC  Supply chain system’s fuzzy profit
The assumptions related to this paper are given as follows:
Assumption 1 The retailer and the manufacturer are both risk, they maximize the 
expected profits.




(α). These ensure that the retailer, the manufacturer and the supply chain sys-

















L(x), x ∈ [d1, d2],
R(x), x ∈ (d2, d3],
0 otherwise.
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Models and solution approaches
In this section, we consider the centralized decision-making system and two types of 
supply chain contracts, namely, the revenue sharing contract and the return contract in 
a fuzzy decision environment, which can tell the manufacturer and the retailer how to 
set their optimal policies in this situation.
Centralized decision‑making system
We first consider the fuzzy centralized decision-making system. In this case, the manu-
facturer cooperates with the retailer and can be considered as the whole channel occu-
pied by an integrated decision maker. Then, the profit for supply chain system is
where the profit Π˜SC is a fuzzy number since p˜, D˜, v˜, c˜m and c˜r are fuzzy numbers. Then, 
the manufacturer and the retailer choose their optimal order quantity q to maximize the 




, which can be expressed as
Note that the fuzzy demand D˜ = (d1, d2, d3) is a positive triangular fuzzy variable, 
then the optimal solution q set by the integrated decision maker has two conditions, 
q ∈ [d1, d2] or q ∈ (d2, d3].
Theorem 1 When q ∈ [d1, d2], the optimal solution q∗ satisfies the following equation

















q − D˜, 0
)













q − D˜, 0
)
− c˜mq − c˜rq
]







p˜−1L (α)− v˜−1R (α)
)










, α ∈ [0, L(q)],








0, q − L−1(α)
]
, α ∈ [0, L(q)],
[0, 0], α ∈ (L(q), 1].
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If α ∈ (L(q), 1], then the α cut set of Π˜SC(α) can be derived as









 about q are


















= 0, we can derive the optimal order quantity q∗ as
Solving Eq. (15), the optimal order quantity q∗ can be derived as shown in Eq. (13).
Theorem 1 is proved.





























−1(α)− (c˜m)−1R (α)q − (c˜r)−1R (α)q ,

























































































p˜−1L (α)− v˜−1R (α)
)



















p˜−1L (α)− v˜−1R (α)
)







p˜−1L (α)− v˜−1R (α)
)
dα = E[c˜m]+ E[c˜r]− E[v˜].
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If α ∈ [0,R(q)], then the α cut set of the fuzzy profit Π˜SC(α) can be obtained as
If α ∈ (R(q), 1], then the α cut set of the fuzzy profit Π˜SC(α) can be derived as





















, α ∈ [0,R(q)],�
L−1(α), R−1(α)
�










0, q − L−1(α)
�
, α ∈ [0,R(q)],�
q − R−1(α), q − L−1(α)
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−1(α)− (c˜m)−1R (α)q − (c˜r)−1R (α)q,












































































−1(α)− (c˜m)−1R (α)q − (c˜r)−1R (α)q + p˜−1R (α)q









−1(α)+ v˜−1L (α)q− v˜−1L (α)R−1(α)− (c˜m)−1R (α)q − (c˜r)−1R (α)q
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= 0, we can derive the optimal order quantity q∗ as
Solving Eq. (18), the optimal order quantity q∗ can be obtained as shown in Eq. (16).
Theorem 2 is proved.
Here, we further consider the fuzzy parameters p˜, v˜, c˜m and c˜r as triangular fuzzy num-
bers as follows
where �ij > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, j = 1, 2.
According to Eqs.  (3) and (7), the α cut sets of the fuzzy parameters p˜, v˜, c˜m, c˜r, and 
their fuzzy expected values can be obtained as
Then, the Theorems 1 and 2 can be translated into the following Theorems 3 and 4, 
respectively.
Theorem 3 When cm + cr +�1 < p ≤ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2, the optimal order quan-












p˜−1R (α)− v˜−1L (α)
)


















p˜−1R (α)− v˜−1L (α)
)
dα + E[v˜]− E[c˜m]− E[c˜r] = 0.
p˜ = (p−�11, p, p+�12), v˜ = (v −�21, v, v +�22),












(α) = cm −�31 +�31α, (c˜m)−1R (α) = cm +�32 −�32α,




(α) = cr −�41 +�41α, (c˜r)−1R (α) = cr +�42 −�42α,





−0.5(p− v −�11 −�22)+
�




1 = 0.2511 − 0.2512 − 0.2531 + 0.2532 − 0.2541 + 0.252,
2 = 0.2512 + 0.2522 + 0.2531 − 0.2532 + 0.2541 − 0.2542,
Page 11 of 25Sang  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:953 
L−1 is the inverse function of L.
Proof When q ∈ [d1, d2], substituting p˜−1L (α), v˜−1R (α), E[p˜], E[c˜m] and E[c˜r] into Eq. (13), 
we can obtain
where
Solving Eq. (20) leads to
Due to 0 ≤ L(q∗) ≤ 1, we have p ≤ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2. where
In addition, in order to let the supply chain members obtain the positive fuzzy profits, 
E[p˜] > E[c˜m] + E[c˜r] must hold.
That is p > cm + cr +�1.
Theorem 3 is proved.
Theorem  4 When p ≥ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2, the optimal order quantity q∗ can be 
expressed as
where
R−1 is the inverse function of R.
Proof When q ∈ (d2, d3], Substituting p˜−1R (α), v˜−1L (α), E[c˜m], E[c˜r] and E[v˜] into 
Eq. (13), we can obtain
where





)+ 0.5(p− v −�11 −�22)L(q∗)− (p− cm − cr −�1) = 0.




∗) = −0.5(p− v −�11 −�22)+
√
0.25(p− v −�11 −�22)2 + (�11 +�22)(p− cm − cr −�1)
0.5(�11 +�22)
.





0.5(p− v +�12 +�21)−
�









)+0.5(p− v +�12 +�21)R(q∗)−(cm + cr − v +�3) = 0.
3 = 0.2521 − 0.2522 − 0.2531 + 0.2532 − 0.2541 + 0.2542.
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Due to 0 ≤ R(q∗) ≤ 1, we have p ≥ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2.
Theorem 4 is proved.
Proposition 5 If p = 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2, then L(q∗) = R(q∗). Proposition 5 reveals 
that the optimal order quantity q∗ is a continuous function with respect to the retail price.
Proposition 6 If ij → 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, j = 1, 2, then the fuzzy parameters p˜, v˜, c˜m, c˜r 
degenerate to crisp values, and the results in Theorems 3 and 4 degenerate to
There are just the solutions in a fuzzy demand environment.
Proof Case 1 q ∈ [d1, d2]
If q ∈ [d1, d2], that is cm + cr +�1 < p ≤ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2, then let ij → 0, we 
can have
Case 2. q ∈ (d2, d3]




∗) = 0.5(p− v +�12 +�21)−
√
























−0.5(p− v −�11 −�22)+
�



































 0.5(p− v +�12 +�21)−
�
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Proposition 6 is proved.
The result of Proposition 6 is similar to that of the works by Xu and Zhai (2010), Ye 
and Li (2011). They only consider the demand as a fuzzy number. Compared to their 
models, the parameters D˜, p˜, v˜, c˜m and c˜r are all assumed to be the triangular fuzzy num-
bers in our model, and their models are special cases of this paper.




 can be 
obtained as follows
Case 1 p ∈ (cm + cr +�1, 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2]
where L(q∗) is given as in Eq. (19).
Case 2 p ∈ [2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2,+∞)
where R(q∗) is given as in Eq. (21).
In the next subsections, we develop two types of supply chain coordinating contracts, 
namely, the revenue sharing contract and the return contract that provide incentive 
mechanism to the retailer and the manufacturer.
Revenue sharing contract
In the RS contract, the manufacturer shares a portion of revenue for retailer. Let Φ 
denote the percentage revenue the retailer keeps, and then 1−Φ denotes the portion 
the manufacturer shares, where 0 < Φ < 1.
Thus, the fuzzy profit functions of the manufacturer and retailer are





. Thus, the retailer’s optimal objective function is

























































q − D˜, 0
))









q − D˜, 0
))















q − D˜, 0
))
− wq − c˜rq
]
(27)s.t. d1 ≤ q ≤ d3.
(28)
w
∗ = Φ(cm + cr − 0.25�31 + 0.25�32 − 0.25�41 + 0.25�42)−(cr − 0.25�41 + 0.25�42).
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Proof Case 1 q ∈ [d1, d2]




 in this case is




 about q are


















= 0, we can derive the optimal order quantity q∗∗ in the RS contract 
as
That is
For coordinating this supply chain, q∗∗ = q∗ must hold. This means that the optimal 
order in the RS contract is the same as that in fuzzy centralized decision-making system.
Comparing Eq. (30) with Eq. (13), we have
Case 2 q ∈ (d2, d3]




 in this case is






























p˜−1L (α)− v˜−1R (α)
)

















p˜−1L (α)− v˜−1R (α)
)







p˜−1L (α)− v˜−1R (α)
)




∗ = Φ(E[c˜m]+ E[c˜r ])− E[c˜r ]







































p˜−1R (α)− v˜−1L (α)
)









p˜−1R (R(q))− v˜−1L (R(q))
)
R′(q).
Page 15 of 25Sang  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:953 


















= 0, we can derive the optimal order quantity q∗∗ as
That is
For coordinating this supply chain, q∗∗ = q∗ must hold.
Comparing Eq. (32) with Eq. (16), we have
Theorem 5 is proved.
Proposition 7 If 31 = 32 = 41 = 42 = 0, then the fuzzy parameters c˜m and c˜r 
degenerate to the crisp values, and the solution in Theorem 5 degenerates to
The solution in Proposition 7 is the same as the result in Cachon and Lariviere (2005), 
they studied the RS contract in a random demand environment. It shows that the opti-
mal wholesale price is not affected with the change of the fuzziness of demand
Theorem 6 In the RS contract, the optimal fuzzy expected profit functions of the mem-
bers are
Proof Case 1 q ∈ [d1, d2]





in the RS contract is










p˜−1R (α)− v˜−1L (α)
)







p˜−1R (α)− v˜−1L (α)
)




∗ = Φ(E[c˜m]+ E[c˜r ])− E[c˜r ]
= Φ(cm + cr − 0.25�31 + 0.25�32 − 0.25�41 + 0.25�42)− (cr − 0.25�41 + 0.25�42).



































Page 16 of 25Sang  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:953 
Case 2 q ∈ (d2, d3]





in the RS contract is




 in this case is
Theorem 6 is proved.
In Theorem 6, the parameter Φ depends on the negotiating ability for the retailer and 
manufacturer. It shows that, the more powerful bargaining the retailer has, the more 
fuzzy expected profit he will derive.
Return contract
In the return contract, if the retailer has the unsold products, then the manufacturer 
should pay unit return price b of these products for the retailer. Thus, the fuzzy profit of 
the manufacturer and retailer can be expressed as follows respectively
In the return contract, the retailer wants to get the optimal order quantity q which 




, which can be denoted as the following 
model
Theorem 7 When cm + cr +�1 < p ≤ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2, the optimal return price 











































































(35)Π˜s = wq − c˜sq − bmax
(













q − D˜, 0
)













q − D˜, 0
)
− c˜rq − wq
]
(37)s.t. d1 ≤ q ≤ d3.
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 in this case is




 about q are
Since L(q) is an increasing function about q with L′(q) > 0, and for any given 










 is a concave function with 







= 0, we can derive the optimal order quantity q∗∗∗ in the return con-
tract as
That is
For coordinating this supply chain, q∗∗∗ = q∗ must hold. That is to say, the optimal 
order quantity q∗∗∗ chosen by the retailer in return contract is equal to that in central-
ized decision-making system.
Comparing Eq. (40) with Eq. (13), we have
Using Eq. (20), we can get the optimal return price b∗ as shown in Eq. (38).
(38)
b∗ = w − cm + 0.25�31 − 0.25�32
p− cm − cr −�1
(√






































































)+ E[p˜]− E[c˜r]− w.
(41)
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Theorem 7 is proved.
Theorem 8 When p ≥ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2, the optimal return price b∗ in return con-
tract is





 in this case is




 about q are
Since R(q) is a decreasing function about q with R′(q) < 0 and for any given 










 is a concave function with 







= 0, we can derive the optimal order quantity q∗∗∗ in the return con-
tract as
That is
For coordinating this supply chain, q∗∗∗ = q∗ must hold.
Comparing Eq. (44) with Eq. (16), we have
(42)
b∗ = w − cm − 0.25�21 + 0.25�22 + 0.25�31 − 0.25�32
p− cm − cr −�3(
0.5(p− v −�12 −�21)+
√




0.5(p− v +�12 +�21)−
√









































































)− b+ w + E[c˜r].








= w − cm − 0.25�21 + 0.25�22 + 0.25�31 − 0.25�32
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Using Eq. (21), we can get the optimal return price b∗ as shown in Eq. (42).
Theorem 8 is proved.
Proposition 8 If ij → 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, j = 1, 2, then the fuzzy parameters p˜, v˜, c˜m, c˜r 
degenerate to the crisp values, and the results in Theorems 7 and 8 degenerate to
There are just the results in a fuzzy demand environment.
Proof Similar to the proof of Proposition 6.
Proposition 9 If we do not take the fuzzy salvage value of product v˜ and the retailer’s 
fuzzy operational cost of product c˜r into consideration, and let 31 = 32 = 0, then the 
results of Theorems 7 and 8 reduce to
There are just the solutions studied in Yu and Jin (2011).









 can be derived as
Case 1 cm + cr +�1 < p ≤ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2
where L(q∗) and b∗ are given as in Eqs. (19) and (38) respectively.
Case 2 p ≥ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2
where R(q∗) and b∗ are given as in Eqs. (21) and (42) respectively.
(45)b
∗ = (p− v)(w − cm)
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Numerical examples
Because the optimal solutions obtained above are in complicated forms, we have to pro-
vide some numerical examples to further illustrate the effectives of the proposed models.
Discussion 1
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of the fuzziness of parameter D˜ on the opti-
mal solutions in both contracts. The fuzzy salvage value of product v˜, the fuzzy produc-
tion cost of product c˜m and the fuzzy operational cost of product c˜r estimated by the 
experience of the decision maker are assumed to be the triangular fuzzy numbers. The 
salvage value of item is nearly $ 3, but not greater than $ 4 and not less than 2, that is 
v˜ = (2, 3, 4) . Similarly, the production cost of item by the manufacturer is nearly $ 15, 
but not greater than $ 16 and not less than 14, that is c˜m = (14, 15, 16). The operational 
cost of item by the retailer is nearly $ 2, but not greater than $ 3 and not less than 1, that 
is c˜r = (1, 2, 3).
Since the optimal order quantity q∗ has two cases, the optimal policies in two con-
tracts can be listed in Tables 1 and 2.
From Tables 1 and 2, we can get the results as follows
1. When p˜ = (22, 25, 28), that satisfies p ≤ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2, q∗ is smaller 
than the most possible value of the demand. When p˜ = (32, 35, 38), that satisfies 
p > 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2, q∗ is larger than the most possible value of the demand in 
both contracts.
2. The fuzziness the parameter D˜ decreases as d2 increases or d3 decreases. No mat-
ter in what kind of supply chain contract, when p ≤ 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2, the opti-
mal order quantity q∗ increases as the fuzziness of parameter D˜ decreases. How-
ever, when p > 2(cm + cr)− v − 2�2, decreasing the fuzziness of parameter D˜ will 
decrease the order quantity q∗.
3. The change of retail price p˜ and fuzziness of parameter D˜ will not impact on the 
wholesale price w∗ in the RS contract. This is because the wholesale price w∗ is 
impacted only by the parameters c˜s and c˜r. In addition, the change of the fuzziness of 
demand D˜ has no impact on the return price b in the return contract.















(22, 25, 28) (100, 200, 300) 181.51 8.20 681.03 454.02 1135.05
(110, 200, 290) 183.36 8.20 708.93 472.62 1181.55
(120, 200, 280) 185.21 8.20 736.82 491.22 1228.04
(130, 200, 270) 187.06 8.20 764.72 509.82 1274.54
(140, 200, 260) 188.90 8.20 792.62 528.41 1321.03
(150, 200, 250) 190.75 8.20 820.52 547.01 1367.53
(32, 35, 38) (100, 200, 300) 218.54 8.20 1736.75 1157.83 2894.58
(110, 200, 290) 216.68 8.20 1779.07 1186.05 2965.12
(120, 200, 280) 214.83 8.20 1821.40 1214.26 3035.66
(130, 200, 270) 212.97 8.20 1863.72 1242.48 3106.20
(140, 200, 260) 211.12 8.20 1906.05 1270.70 3176.75
(150, 200, 250) 209.27 8.20 1948.37 1298.92 3247.29
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4. When the fuzziness of market demand decreases, the expected profits for all mem-
bers increase. In other words, the retailer, the manufacturer and the supply chain 
system all gain more expected profit when the fuzziness of demand is lower. This is 
intuitive because the lower the fuzziness of demand, the more efficient of the supply 
chain system. Therefore, for the manufacturer and retailer, they should seek as low 
fuzziness of market demand as possible in both contracts.
Discussion 2
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of retail price’s fuzziness on optimal policies 
in two contracts. The demand of the market is nearly 200, but not greater than 300 and 
not less than 100, that is D˜ = (100, 200, 300). The other fuzzy parameters are the same as 
above discussion. The optimal solutions obtained are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
5. The optimal order quantity q∗ drops as the fuzziness of retail price p˜ falls in both 
contracts. It indicates that increasing the fuzziness of retail price p˜ can simulate the 
order quantity.















(22, 25, 28) (100, 200, 300) 181.51 15.86 429.03 706.02 1135.05
(110, 200, 290) 183.36 15.86 446.13 735.42 1181.55
(120, 200, 280) 185.21 15.86 463.22 764.82 1228.04
(130, 200, 270) 187.06 15.86 480.32 794.22 1274.54
(140, 200, 260) 188.90 15.86 497.42 823.61 1321.03
(150, 200, 250) 190.75 15.86 514.51 853.01 1367.53
(32, 35, 38) (100, 200, 300) 218.54 11.84 2091.30 803.28 2894.58
(110, 200, 290) 216.68 11.84 2142.17 822.95 2965.12
(120, 200, 280) 214.83 11.84 2193.04 842.62 3035.66
(130, 200, 270) 212.97 11.84 2243.91 862.29 3106.20
(140, 200, 260) 211.12 11.84 2294.78 881.97 3176.75
(150, 200, 250) 209.27 11.84 2345.65 901.64 3247.29
Table 3 The RS contract policies with Φ = 0.6












(20, 25, 30) 186.10 8.20 696.22 464.14 1160.36
(21, 25, 29) 183.79 8.20 688.46 458.97 1147.43
(22, 25, 28) 181.51 8.20 681.03 454.02 1135.05
(23, 25, 27) 179.25 8.20 673.94 449.29 1123.23
(24, 25, 26) 177.03 8.20 667.16 444.78 1111.94
(25, 25, 25) 174.86 8.20 660.70 440.47 1101.17
(30, 35, 40) 221.44 8.20 1762.66 1175.11 2937.77
(31, 35, 39) 220.00 8.20 1749.60 1166.40 2916.00
(32, 35, 38) 218.54 8.20 1736.75 1157.83 2894.58
(33, 35, 37) 217.05 8.20 1724.10 1149.40 2873.51
(34, 35, 36) 215.55 8.20 1711.68 1141.12 2852.80
(35, 35, 35) 214.03 8.20 1699.48 1132.99 2832.46
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6. The change of the fuzziness of retail price p˜ has no impact on w∗ in the RS contract. 
Conversely, the return price b∗ increases as the fuzziness of retail price p˜ decreases in 
the return contract.
7. When the fuzziness of retail price decreases, the expected profits for all members 
decrease. This is because a decrease in fuzziness of retail price results in a decrease in 
order quantity. This results in the decrease of the fuzzy expected profit of the retailer, 
the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. Therefore, for the manufacturer and 
the retailer, they should seek as high fuzziness of the retail price as possible in both 
contracts.
Discussion 3
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of salvage value’s fuzziness on optimal poli-
cies in two contracts. The fuzzy demand is assumed to be D˜ = (100, 200, 300). The other 
fuzzy parameters are the same as above discussion. The optimal solutions obtained are 
shown in Tables 5 and 6.
8. The change of fuzziness of salvage value v˜ will not impact on the wholesale price w∗ 
in the RS contract. This is because the wholesale price w∗ is impacted only by the 
Table 4 The return contract policies with w = 20












(20, 25, 30) 186.10 15.18 442.45 717.91 1160.36
(21, 25, 29) 183.79 15.52 435.49 711.93 1147.43
(22, 25, 28) 181.51 15.86 429.03 706.02 1135.05
(23, 25, 27) 179.25 16.22 423.03 700.20 1123.23
(24, 25, 26) 177.03 16.60 417.45 694.49 1111.94
(25, 25, 25) 174.86 16.98 412.28 688.89 1101.17
(30, 35, 40) 221.44 11.63 2126.70 811.07 2937.77
(31, 35, 39) 220.00 11.73 2108.80 807.20 2916.00
(32, 35, 38) 218.54 11.84 2091.30 803.28 2894.58
(33, 35, 37) 217.05 11.96 2074.20 799.31 2873.51
(34, 35, 36) 215.55 12.08 2057.50 795.30 2852.80
(35, 35, 35) 214.03 12.20 2041.20 791.26 2832.46
Table 5 The RS contract policies with Φ = 0.6












(22, 25, 28) (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) 181.51 8.20 681.03 454.02 1135.05
(2.2, 3.0, 3.8) 181.05 8.20 679.59 453.06 1132.65
(2.4, 3.0, 3.6) 180.60 8.20 678.16 452.10 1130.26
(2.6, 3.0, 3.4) 180.15 8.20 676.74 451.16 1127.90
(2.8, 3.0, 3.2) 179.70 8.20 675.33 450.22 1125.55
(32, 35, 38) (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) 218.54 8.20 1736.75 1157.83 2894.58
(2.2, 3.0, 3.8) 218.24 8.20 1734.20 1156.13 2890.33
(2.4, 3.0, 3.6) 217.94 8.20 1731.66 1154.44 2886.10
(2.6, 3.0, 3.4) 217.65 8.20 1729.13 1152.76 2881.89
(2.8, 3.0, 3.2) 217.35 8.20 1726.61 1151.08 2877.69
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parameters c˜s and c˜r. In addition, the return price b∗ decreases slightly as the fuzzi-
ness of salvage value v˜ decreases in the return contract.
9. When the fuzziness of salvage value decreases, the expected profits for the manu-
facturer and the retailer decrease. That is to say, the decreasing fuzziness of salvage 
value results in decreasing order quantity thereby the fuzzy expected profit of the 
retailer, the manufacturer and the whole supply chain decreases. Therefore, for the 
supply chain members, they should seek as high fuzziness of salvage value v˜ as pos-
sible in both contracts.
Based on the three discussions above, the following findings can be achieved:
10. Both contracts can achieve the coordination of the supply chain in a fuzzy envi-
ronment, in which the manufacturer and the retailer obtain the same total fuzzy 
expected profits as the centralized decision-making system.
11. The manufacturer and the retailer will lower the fuzziness of demand, and increase 
the fuzziness of retail price and salvage value in order to deal with the environment 
uncertainty, which increases the retailer’s order quantity and eventually leads to the 
increase of the fuzzy expected profits.
Conclusions
This article deals with the coordination problems of the retailer and the manufacturer 
in a fuzzy decision environment, where the RS contract and the return contract are 
employed. For examining the performance of supply chain members in two contracts, 
we apply the fuzzy set theory to solve these fuzzy models. We find that the change of 
fuzziness of the demand does not impact on the wholesale prices in both contracts, the 
supply chain members should seek as low fuzziness of demand, and high fuzziness of 
retail price and salvage value as possible. The model proposed in this article is easy to 
perform and needs little data, and can be apply for newly development items with a 
short life cycle such as PC, communication and consumer electronic category.
One limitation in this study is that we only consider one retailer and one manufac-
turer in a two stage supply. Future research can be done for the situations including two 
or more competing supply chain members or in a multi-stage supply chain. The other 
Table 6 The return contract policies with w = 20












(22, 25, 28) (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) 181.51 15.86 429.03 706.02 1135.05
(2.2, 3.0, 3.8) 181.05 15.81 428.24 704.41 1132.65
(2.4, 3.0, 3.6) 180.60 15.76 427.45 702.81 1130.26
(2.6, 3.0, 3.4) 180.15 15.72 426.66 701.23 1127.90
(2.8, 3.0, 3.2) 179.70 15.67 425.88 699.67 1125.55
(32, 35, 38) (2.0, 3.0, 4.0) 218.54 11.84 2091.30 803.28 2894.58
(2.2, 3.0, 3.8) 218.24 11.78 2089.22 801.11 2890.33
(2.4, 3.0, 3.6) 217.94 11.72 2087.14 798.96 2886.10
(2.6, 3.0, 3.4) 217.65 11.66 2085.06 796.83 2881.89
(2.8, 3.0, 3.2) 217.35 11.60 2082.97 794.72 2877.69
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limitation is that the parameters of the supply chain models are considered as triangular 
fuzzy numbers. In fact, the membership function of the fuzzy number can be nonlinear, 
one can consider the case the parameters are fuzzy random variables. The third limita-
tion is that the supply chain members are all assumed to be risk neutral. It is still inter-
esting to discuss the problem how to design the contract policies when the supply chain 
members are risk averse or risk preference in a fuzzy environment.
Acknowledgements
This work was financially supported by the Shandong Provincial Natural Science Foundation, China (No. ZR2015GQ001), 
and the Project of Shandong Provincial Higher Educational Humanity and Social Science Research Program (No. 
J15WB04).
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.
Received: 7 March 2016   Accepted: 24 May 2016
References
Abdolmajidi E, Harrie L, Mansourian A (2016) The stock-flow model of spatial data infrastructure development refined by 
fuzzy logic. SpringerPlus 5:267
Ai X, Chen J, Zhao H, Tang X (2012) Competition among supply chains: implications of full returns policy. Int J Prod Econ 
139:257–265
Boutkhoum O, Hanine M, Agouti T, Tikniouine A (2015) An improved hybrid multi-criteria/multidimensional model for 
strategic industrial location selection: casablanca industrial zones as a case study. SpringerPlus 4:628
Cachon GP, Lariviere MA (2005) Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations. 
Manag Sci 51:30–44
Chang SY, Yeh TY (2013) A two-echelon supply chain of a returnable product with fuzzy demand. Appl Math Model 
37:4305–4315
Chen J (2011) The impact of sharing customer returns information in a supply chain with and without a buyback policy. 
Eur J Oper Res 213:478–488
Chen J, Bell PC (2011) Coordinating a decentralized supply chain with customer returns and price-dependent stochastic 
demand using a buyback policy. Eur J Oper Res 212:293–300
Chen J, Bell PC (2012) Implementing market segmentation using full-refund and no-refund customer returns policies in a 
dual-channel supply chain structure. Int J Prod Econ 136:56–66
Chen SP, Cheng BH (2014) Optimal echelon stock policies for multi-stage supply chains in fuzzy environments. Int J Prod 
Res 52:3431–3449
Chen JM, Cheng HL, Chien MC (2011) On channel coordination through revenue-sharing contracts with price and shelf-
space dependent demand. Appl Math Model 35:4886–4901
Giovanni PD (2014) Environmental collaboration in a closed-loop supply chain with a reverse revenue sharing contract. 
Ann Oper Res 220:135–157
Hanine M, Boutkhoum M, Tikniouine A, Agouti T (2016) Comparison of fuzzy AHP and fuzzy TODIM methods for landfill 
location selection. SpringerPlus 5:501
Hsueh CF (2014) Improving corporate social responsibility in a supply chain through a new revenue sharing contract. Int 
J Prod Econ 151:214–222
Hu JS, Zheng H, Xu RQ, Ji YP, Cai CY (2010) Supply chain coordination for fuzzy random newsboy problem with imperfect 
quality. Int J Approx Reason 51:771–784
Huang X, Gu JW, Ching WK, Siu TK (2014) Impact of secondary market on consumer return policies and supply chain 
coordination. Omega 45:57–70
Kazemi N, Ehsani E, Jaber MY (2010) An inventory model with backorders with fuzzy parameters and decision variables. 
Int J Approx Reason 51:964–972
Krishnan H, Winter RA (2011) On the role of revenue-sharing contracts in supply chains. Oper Res Lett 39:28–31
Liu B, Liu Y (2002) Expected value of fuzzy variable and fuzzy expected value model. IEEE Trans Fuzzy Syst 10:445–450
Palsule-Desai OD (2013) Supply chain coordination using revenue-dependent revenue sharing contracts. Omega 
41:780–796
Panda S (2014) Coordination of a socially responsible supply chain using revenue sharing contract. Transp Res E Logist 
67:92–104
Samal NK, Pratihar DK (2014) Optimization of variable demand fuzzy economic order quantity inventory models without 
and with backordering. Comput Ind Eng 78:148–162
Sang S (2013) Supply chain contracts with multiple retailers in a fuzzy demand environment. Math Probl Eng 2013:1–12
Van Der Rhee B, Van Der Veen JAA, Venugopal V, Nalla VR (2010) A new revenue sharing mechanism for coordinating 
multi-echelon supply chains. Oper Res Lett 38:296–301
Van Der Rhee B, Schmidt G, Van Der Veen JAA, Venugopal V (2014) Revenue-sharing contracts across an extended supply 
chain. Bus Horizons 57:473–482
Page 25 of 25Sang  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:953 
Wu D (2013) Coordination of competing supply chains with news-vendor and buyback contract. Int J Prod Econ 
144:1–13
Xu R, Zhai X (2008) Optimal models for single-period supply chain problems with fuzzy demand. Inf Sci 178:3374–3381
Xu R, Zhai X (2010) Analysis of supply chain coordination under fuzzy demand in a two-stage supply chain. Appl Math 
Model 34:129–139
Yao DQ, Yue X, Wang X, Liu JJ (2005) The impact of information sharing on a returns policy with the addition of a direct 
channel. Int J Prod Econ 97:196–209
Yao Z, Leung SCH, Lai KK (2008) Analysis of the impact of price-sensitivity factors on the returns policy in coordinating 
supply chain. Eur J Oper Res 187:275–282
Ye F, Li Y (2011) A Stackelberg single-period supply chain inventory model with weighted possibilistic mean values under 
fuzzy environment. Appl Soft Comput 11:5519–5527
Yoo SH (2014) Product quality and return policy in a supply chain under risk aversion of a supplier. Int J Prod Econ 
154:146–155
Yu Y, Jin T (2011) The return policy model with fuzzy demands and asymmetric information. Appl Soft Comput 
11:1669–1678
Yu Y, Zhu J, Wang C (2013) A newsvendor model with fuzzy price-dependent demand. Appl Math Model 37:2644–2661
Zhang WG, Fu F, Li H, Xu W (2012) Coordination of supply chain with a revenue-sharing contract under demand disrup-
tions when retailers compete. Int J Prod Econ 138:68–75
Zhang B, Lu S, Zhang D, Wen K (2014) Supply chain coordination based on a buyback contract under fuzzy random vari-
able demand. Fuzzy Sets Syst 255:1–16
Zhao Y, Choi TM, Cheng TCE, Sethi SP, Wang S (2014) Buyback contracts with price-dependent demands: effects of 
demand uncertainty. Eur J Oper Res 239:663–673
